Introduction
Much of the rhetoric about the world economy in the past ten years has focused on the issue of "globalization." The argument usually goes like this: One of the central features of economic globalization has been the rapid expansion of world trade. Trade increased rapidly during the 1990s and almost doubled between 1993 and 1997. 1 The main actors in this expansion are the world's largest multinational corporations that are viewed as the engines of trade (United Nations, 2000) . These firms use new information technologies and improvements in transportation to enter new markets and disperse their activities in all parts of the world. One of their main goals is to take advantage of cheap sources of labor around the world (Castells, 1997) . There are a number of outcomes that are frequently predicted by those who have this view of globalization. The developed world, it is argued, is losing jobs and their share of trade to less developed countries. Thus, governments in advanced industrial societies are expected to reduce taxes and social spending, and lower labor market protection in order to avoid capital flight (Cable, 1995) . Firms are becoming increasingly "transnational" such that they have lost national identities and are now owned and managed by a world capitalist class (Sklair, 2001 ).
The problem with this neat story lies in the great deal of evidence that undermines it (see the papers in Boyer and Drache, 1997; Berger and Dore , 1997; Crouch, and Streeck, 1997 ; and the work by Rodrik, 1999; Garrett, 1998a) . While world trade increased rapidly during the mid 1990s, it slowed dramatically during the past three years, mainly as a result of the economic slowdown in Asia (WTO, 2000) . If one considers world trade as a percentage of world economic activity, one concludes that this rapid increase still means that world trade only accounts for less than 17% of world economic activity (Fligstein, 2001) . If one takes a longer view on trade, one can show that world trade hit its previous peak in 1913 when it accounted for about 14% of world GDP. Two World Wars and the Depression of the 1930s left World trade at about 6% of GDP in 1950. It took almost 70 years for world trade to hit its previous high point again (Bairoch, 1996) . These numbers suggest that one should be cautious about the degree to which the increase in world trade is a truly revolutionizing phenomenon.
The same can be said about the trade's alleged effects on both governments and corporations.
There is little evidence that world trade has reduced the ability of governments to intervene into their economies and engage in welfare state activities. Indeed, it appears that, in societies where trade has expanded, social protection has expanded as well (Rodrik, 1999) . The globalization thesis assumes that firms will relocate wherever taxes and production costs are lower. Prima facie, heavy state involvement, by virtue of the resources it levies and the various regulations it implements, increases production costs substantially. For Garrett (1998b) , however, this assertion neglects the positive externalities of state intervention. In order to entrench the market, it is necessary to insure the compliance of citizens, and this is done through the reduction of inequality and a certain level of decommodification. Firms are not looking for low costs, but for high levels of productivity and market stability. This is especially true in capital-intensive industries, where the wage component of outlays is not crucial, and physical capital is difficult to move, but where huge amounts of capital are at stake. In addition to physical infrastructures, the state provides an educated, market-compliant, and productive workforce. It also stabilizes the economic environment. Human capital enhancement and social stability constitute a benefit for firms, and this enters into their investment calculus. As a result, increasing levels of economic openness have not caused a decrease in government spending; nor have they caused capital flight in the countries studied. As globalization really took off, effective levels of taxation and governement spending have followed an upward trend in the last 20 years. Moreover, fiscal and macroeconomic policies have not converged during this era, pointing to the endurance of substantial state autonomy. Export-dependent countries still spend a lot more on public goods than ones that are relatively closed or that have trade deficits. Similarly, there is little evidence that American, European, Japanese and large corporations from the rest of the developed and developing world have come to be owned by an international group of investors who have no nationality (see the review in Fligstein, 2001, chap. 8) .
And as we shall demonstrate, trade shares for the first world have not declined in the past twenty years, but have in fact increased.
In spite of these results, which contradict the basic globalization story, scholars remain fascinated with the recent trajectory of the world economy. They remain convinced that even if the single capitalist world is not the current reality, it will most probably shape the future. The European Union began as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and expanded to become the European Economic Community (EEC). The original intent of the ECSC was to stabilize the production of steel across Europe in order to prevent ruinous competition during the 1950s. The EEC formed to expand the activities of the alliance to cooperation in agricultural policies and various industrial policies. The Treaty of Rome (1957) , which produced the EEC, had the goal of reducing tariffs and other trade barriers, thereby promoting free trade and economic growth. Both R. Schuman and J. Monnet, the principal intellectual architects of the EEC, felt that if the European societies had economies that were more integrated, governments would be less tempted to engage in military activities that would end up in war.
The EC underwent a set of reforms beginning in the mod 1980s and re-constituted itself as the European Union (hereafter EU). The EU has moved from being a customs union to a full-fledged "single market." The "single market" means that most tariff and nontariff trade barriers have been removed, rules have been created to facilitate trade, an apparatus exists to enforce a common competition policy, and a single currency has been created for economic transaction across Europe. Europeanization has meant that decisions taken in Brussels by the EU governments and the Commission have produced a single set of rules for market exchange across Europe. This political project has provided the legal underpinnings to European wide free trade.
To make sense of these processes, our argument begins by trying to define what an integrated market would look like for a given commodity. We use the theory of fields extended to the context of markets (Fligstein, 2001; Bourdieu, 2000) to gain conceptual leverage on this question. We argue that an integrated market requires a single system of rules of exchange, property rights, and rules of competition and cooperation. In Europe, the creation of common, transparent "rules of exchange" that make trade easier in the European space has gone hand in hand with political unification. Especially since the 1979 Arrêt Cassis de Dijon, which forced the mutual recognition of national legislations pertaining to commerce, the EU has by and large also come to coordinate rules of competition and cooperation for firms involved in trade across borders. While there has been thus far less convergence across Europe in property rights, the European Commission has recently proposed the creation of a common incorporation label, société européenne, that should eventually undermine the currently national systems of property rights.
We then consider the degree to which European markets have become integrated, both synchronically and diachronically. Examining cross-border trade reveals that, over time, the share of The data point to a startling conclusion. Market integration in Europe was an explicitly political project carried by national states and, arguably, savvy political entrepreneurs (for competing views on this issue, see Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1998 , Pierson, 1996 . Its effects in the past fifteen years have been to increase trade dramatically in Europe and create a single market. Thus, at least part of what we mean by globalization needs to be recast. European governments intentionally created the possibilities for more trade by removing impediments to trade and producing rules to govern and encourage trade.
This has resulted in the densest economic zone in the world with the exception of the United States.
Globalization is thus not a mysterious force outside of the control of governments and driven by rapacious corporations. Instead, the most successful globalization/trade project is one where governments intentionally have cooperated the most extensively. They have produced a single set of rules and an enforcement mechanism (the European Court of Justice) that by and large encourage cross border trade. Their cooperation has paid off by creating jobs and economic growth in Western Europe.
There are several lessons to be learned here. First, market integration projects work much better with states and rules that are enforceable. Second, there may in fact be multiple globalization projects going on around the world. The idea of "globalization" is appealing because it suggests a single dynamic for world economic activity. What our analysis suggests, however, is that there may be multiple dynamics at work in the world economy. These dynamics vary greatly depending on the relationships between states, rules, and firms. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.
What is an Integrated Market?
The theory of fields can be invoked as a conceptual apparatus of a distinctively sociological nature to understand how market society functions. As forms of social organization, market structures involve both cognitive understandings and concrete social relations. In this perspective, markets are construed as arenas of objective relations between positions, or fields, that contain collective actors who try and produce a system of domination in the field. In each market as in each social field, a prereflexive local culture (or doxa) is generated that defines social relations between actors -e.g. incumbent and challenger firms. They also provide actors w ith cognitive frames to interpret the actions of other organizations. Fligstein (1990 Fligstein ( , 2001 ) has called these local understandings "conceptions of control."
Once stabilized, interaction becomes a "game" where groups in the field that have more power use the acceptable cultural rules to reproduce their domination. This makes action in fields continuously conflictual and inherently political.
The existence of stable markets would be impossible without the aegis of the state (Polanyi, 1944; Fligstein, 1990) . The state is a set of fields or policy domains where actors claim the power to make and enforce rules for all of the other actors in society (Krasner, 1988) . In modern societies, these orders are governed by formal (constitutions and laws) and informal rules (practices) that create and limit which arenas can be collectively dominated, who gets to be a player, and how rule-making is to go on in the domain. The functioning of markets is thus predicated on the existence of a meta-set of rules.
Once institutionalized, these rules both enable and constrain subsequent behavior. They constrain behavior by defining how competition and conflict can be legally regulated. They enable incumbent firms to survive and produce stable markets. They also enable firms to create new markets.
Using the idea of markets as fields requires one to specify what a market is, who the players are, what it means to be an incumbent and a challenger, and how the social relationships and cultural understandings that come into play create stable fields by solving the main competition problems and controlling uncertainty. A stable "market as field" means that the main players in a given market are able to reproduce their firms. The social relations between sellers in a stable market is one whereby one set of firms produces a dominant frame for the market and the other firms fall in line. We thus accept the view that a market is a "self-reproducing role structure of producers" (White, 1981) . These organizations manage to create social relations between competitors that govern competition. They use these social relations to remain in existence on a period-to-period basis.
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There are four types of rules relevant to producing social structures in markets -what can be called property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control. It is through the existence of these institutions that actors produce social structures to organize themselves, to compete and cooperate, and to exchange with one another in a regular and reproducible fashion. Each of these types of social structure is directed at different problems of instability. Some are more related to the general problem of creating a market in the first place and others have to do with insuring the stability of firms in a particular market.
States play an important role in the emergence of stable markets. It is possible to imagine a world where property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange emerge from the interactions of market actors. But such a world would generally be relatively small scaled and probably inherently unstable. We know that in the most advanced industrial societies, states have played a pivotal role in producing stable institutional settings for markets to emerge. As firms have grown and become more sophisticated, they have made demands on states for rules to promote market growth. States provide rules and courts so that market actors can engage in exchange and be able to try and construct stable markets.
Property rights are rules that define who has claims on the profits of firms, akin to what agency theorists call "residual claims" on the free cash flow of firms (Jensen and Meckling 1974) . Property rights are necessary to markets because they define the social relationships between owners and everyone else in society. This stabilizes markets by making it clear who is risking what and who gets the reward, in a particular market situation. A given firm's suppliers know who is the responsible entity.
Property rights thus function to produce two forms of stability: defining the power relationships between constituencies in and around firms, and signalling to other firms who they are. 4 One aspect of European integration that has not produced convergence yet is around the issue of who owns the largest corporations in Europe. There is little evidence that the Single Market has produced a capitalist elite that transcends national borders (Pauly and Reich present similar evidence for all multinationals, 1999).
Indeed, large firms remain owned by people in particular societies, by and large, and dependent on their home governments for several of their activities (Wade, 1996 ; see the papers in Blair and Roe, 2000) .
This has been the intention of the European governments who have explicitly rejected setting up a European wide market for corporate control. Note, however, that very significant changes are perceptible. The surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, analyzed below, and the increasingly keen interest shown by the European Commission for establishing a pan-European incorporation framework might alter the evolution of property rights in Europe.
Governance structures refer to the general rules in a society that define relations of competition, cooperation, and definitions of how firms should be organized. These rules define the legal and illegal forms of how firms can control competition. They take two forms: (1) laws and (2) Product standardization has become increasingly important in the context of rules of exchange, particularly in the telecommunications and computer industries. There exist extensive national and international bodies meet to agree on standards for products across many industries. Standard settings produces shared rules that guarantee that products will be compatible. This facilitates exchange by making it more certain that produce bought and sold will work the way they are intended. Rules of exchange help stabilize markets by insuring that exchanges occur under a set of rules that apply to everyone. If firms who ship their goods across a particular society do not have rules of exchange, such exchanges will be haphazard at best. Making these rules has become even more important for trade across societies. The European Union's Single Market Program has arguably been the most successful attempt to produce and harmonize international practices around rules of exchange.
The purpose of action in a given market is to create and maintain stable worlds within and across firms that allow dominant firms to survive. Conceptions of control refer to both the understandings that structure perceptions of how a particular market works and the real relations of domination in the market. A conception of control is simultaneously a worldview that allows actors to interpret the actions of others and a reflection of how the market is structured. Conceptions of control reflect market specific agreements between actors in firms on principles of internal organization (i.e., forms of hierarchy), tactics for competition or cooperation (i.e., strategies), and the hierarchy or status ordering of firms in a given market. A conception of control is a form of "local knowledge" (Geertz 1983 ). Conceptions of control are historical and cultural products. They are historically specific to a certain industry in a certain society. They are cultural in that they form a set of understandings and practices about how things work in a particular market setting. The local market orders that ensue refer to a set of firms that take one another into account in their actions and, in doing so, are able to reproduce themselves on a period to period basis. All markets, whether organized in a city, a region, or across societies, can be analyzed from this perspective. It will be interesting to study whether and how conceptions of control have converged in Western Europe under the impetus of market integration.
The Integration of European Markets
There are two sorts of market integration projects that the analysis above suggests. First, is the politicallegal project that would produce a single set of rules for exchange, governance, and property rights to govern market activities in a geographic area. To say that there exists a single market in a geographic area would imply that there exists a single set of rules to govern exchange, to regulate competition and cooperation between firms, and to define property rights. In the real world, there are no pure "single" or "integrated" markets. Even the United States, which is often held up as a single market, does not have a single set of rules defining property rights and there are some differences across states in rules of exchange. These are caused by the fact the U.S. is a federal system. In the evolution of the national economy, state governments have kept some jurisdiction over economic activities within their borders.
The U.S. remains nevertheless the most integrated market of its size in the world.
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The second way in which markets are integrated concerns exactly who the main market participants are, and whether they use common conceptions of control and rely on a common set of property rights. It is possible that markets are integrated in terms of laws and practices, but that because of which firms are in the markets, they may be in reality fragmented geographically. This is the dimension we wish to address in this paper. More specifically, we will explore whether and how the convergence in governance structures, rules of exchange, and to a lesser degree property rights in the EU has generated a more integrated market for firms. Europeanization implies that the political-legal market integration project ought to encourage European corporations to focus their activities on cross European border trade. We expect that the completion of the single market has led firms to adjust their focus on all of Europe, and to not focus narrowly on the home country, keeping non-European activities constant.
In earlier work, Fligstein and Mara-Drita (1996) show how the Single Market Project of the EU was mostly concerned with rules of exchange. Between 1986 and 1992 the EU passed about 250 pieces of legislation that were oriented towards completing the single market. The EU has also evolved a competition policy that is concerned with preventing the emergence of monopolies. The only type of policy that was not agreed to over this period was a single system of property rights. There is an ongoing attempt to create a European wide system of incorporation, but it so far has not generated much integration.
As a result, the governance of ownership relations had mostly remained a national matter. In If one accepts that Europe is a single market in terms of market access, the ease of engaging in transactions across national borders, and competition policy, then one can turn to the degree to which
Europe is actually a single market in practice. This implies examining the data on trade within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world over time.
( Table 1 about here) To push the Europeanization thesis, it is necessary to show the importance of the EU in world trade. We know world trade has been increasing in the past 20 years, both in absolute terms, and as a share of the world economy. were the developing countries of Asia while the real losers were the former Soviet Union and the rest of the developing world.
( Table 2 about here) Since Europe maintained its share of world trade as world trade doubled in the 1990s, this suggests that part of the surge in world trade that occurred during the 1990s was the direct result of the EU removing market barriers and creating a single political-legal structure to govern trade.
( Table 3 about here)
It is useful to disaggegrate these trade patterns over time and country. Table 3 provides data on the destination of manufacturing exports for most countries in the EU between 1970 and 1997. Every member of the EU increased its manufacturing exports to other EU countries over time. This is evidence that the Single Market was an opportunity that European firms used to increase their European exports.
By 1997, 90% of French and 81% of German manufacturing exports ended up in the EU. One can also see the dramatic effect that joining the EU had on the export orientation of producers. Once inside, they found restrictions on exporting had been removed and they expanded their sales across the EU.
So, Austrian manufacturers increased their EU share of exports from 53% in 1970 to 78% in 1997,
Ireland from 27% to 42%, Portugal from 28% to 64% and Spain from 43% to 81%.
Taken together, these tables clearly point in the direction of the important role that European market integration played in changes in trade in the world in the past 20 years. They suggest the very concrete view that the EU political-legal project to produce a single market has by and large succeeded in the sense that European firms responded to these opportunities by expanding European trade.
Moreover, joining the EU and accepting the common structure of trade rules in Europe had a similar effect. Firms in Western Europe have come to increase their trade generally and focused more and more of their export activities on European markets.
At the very least, the story about globalization we opened with in this paper is too broad as a description of what is happening to world trade. In fact, what has been going on in the world economy are at least three main trends: Europeanization, the growth in trade in Asia, and the increasing trade shares generally of the developed societies. Asian societies have increased their share of world exports, not at the expense of the developed world, but at the expense of the less developed world. Western Europe continues to be the largest trade zone in the world with almost half of world trade occurring across its borders. This share has remained stable over time. What has changed is that European countries, as a result of the single market, are trading more with each other, and less with the rest of the world. Taken together, this is evidence that European markets are continuing to integrate in the sense that European firms are coming to face one another more and more in European product markets.
Europeanization and the Strategies of Large Firms
If trade across Europe has grown more dense, it is interesting to consider exactly what this means for corporations. One can imagine that firms engaged in export would pursue one of two strategies as they expand their activities in Europe. First, they could decide to redistribute their activities across Europe.
This would mean that they would make investment in plant capacity and buy up firms in other countries.
They could do this to lower the costs of their wage bills or to just be closer to finished markets.
Alternatively, since the single market means that European firms are theoretically free to ship goods anywhere in Europe with few barriers, firms could decide to stay at home. Indeed, as trade barriers decrease and transportation and communications costs decrease, firms would feel less compelled to relocate facilities to other societies.
The first data we consider come from a study of the world's largest multinational corporations in 1987 (Stafford and Purkis, 1989 1999) . This data set is unique in that it contains information on more than 300 of the world's largest multinational corporations of all nationalities. It attempts to disaggregate where firms have their main investments, assesses their major markets, and considers their main strategies. When the information was not available or incomplete for a specific firm at a specific point in time, we used annual reports and 10K forms. Also, the information was sometimes available only for one year prior to or after the years chosen as cutoff points: consequently, the time span covered for a firm is sometimes 9 or 11 years instead of 10. Still, having data at two time points allows us to see if the world's largest multinationals have converged or diverged in their strategies of spreading productive activities. This data set only contains information on corporations that are doing business in three or more countries and rely on foreign sales for more than 10% of their activities. Thus, the sample is highly biased toward including only the most globalized firms in the world. This dataset provides a stringent test for our view that the largest corporations in Europe are becoming Europeanized. If there is a more general homogenization of the spread of economic activities of the largest multinationals around the world, then this sample of firms is the most likely to reveal it.
( Unfortunately, the number of European firms that reported the geographical distribution of their assets was extremely low compared to non European, mostly American firms. To remedy this limitation,
we also looked at the geographical distribution of their employees, a figure that was provided by a much larger number of European firms. If not as a proxy, this data can at least be used to complement the trends observed in the geographical distribution of assets. The results are as striking. While, on average, 53% of the personnel of EU firms was located in these firms' home country around 1987, the number had decreased to 47% around 1997. But conversely, the percentage of employees of EU firms working in Europe surged to 32% in 1997, from 25% in 1987. This is a very clear indication that, for EU firms, the decline in strictly domestic employment was more than offset, or absorbed, by a parallel increase in These results, taken together suggest that EU multinationals are much more Eurocentric than multinationals in general. They tend to invest more in Europe, export more of what they produce in general than large multinationals, and export most of their products to the rest of Europe. Over time, they have increased their investments and sales to the rest of Europe and have shifted away from the home market. It is no exaggeration to say that EU multinationals are predominantly "Europeanized."
Non EU multinationals have increased the size of their EU operations as well. The EU's Single market has gotten those firms to invest more in Europe and sell more in Europe. Since the bulk of these firms are from the U.S. and Japan, this confirms the view that to the degree that there is a globalization project going on, it is about the growing closeness of the developed world. One needs to be cautious in overinterpreting these data as evidence for globalization. After all, fully three-quarters of investment and sales of non EU multinationals occurs outside Europe.
Changes in Investment Patterns in Europe
One of the main problems of this analysis is that it focuses only on the largest corporations.
Thus, while it tells a story that is pretty consistent with our Europeanization story, it is a story that is ( Figure 3 about here) Figure 3 shows the national identity of buyers and sellers. In the early 1980s, the typical merger in
Europe was between two producers within a single society. In 1982 about 50% of all mergers were of this variety. About 32% of mergers were cross border between European firms and only 18% involved firms from non EU countries. During the merger movement that followed in the wake of the Single Market, this pattern shifted dramatically. In the peak years of the merger movement (1988) (1989) , over 40% of the mergers were cross border while about 40% were within national borders and foreign mergers accounted for about 20% of the total. As the merger movement wound down, national mergers became the norm again and cross border mergers fell off.
These two figures show three sorts of processes at work in the wake of the Single Market. First, European firms generally wanted to get larger and they often did so by merging with other firms to create bigger players for entering the European market. Second, they chose to get large by merging both with other national firms and firms across borders. While the share of national mergers dropped at the peak of the merger movement, they still accounted for a large share of total mergers. There was also a rush by European firms to engage in cross border mergers to enter nearby markets as well. Large
European firms did not just merge with those within their country but they also merged with those across Europe in order to get bigger. Finally, foreign firms played a less important role in European mergers, but still accounted for about 20% of all European mergers. They increased their European presence in this period by engaging in mergers. This data also provides evidence that during the period 1982-1992, the process of Europeanization was pushed forward as large European firms got larger by merging with their principal competitors at home and cross borders.
This data series, unfortunately, ends in 1992. Scholars who want to push the globalization thesis could argue that the 1990s have brought many more cross border mergers and that it was these mergers that were really driving the globalization process. It is difficult to gather data like those in figures 2 and 3 for the 1990s. So one has to approach the issue in a more piecemeal fashion. There are two ways that firms can choose to make investments in other countries: they can buy other firms or they can build new plants and businesses from scratch. Some of the best evidence we have on how investment has changed across Europe comes from data on foreign direct investment.
( Table 5 about here) Table 5 presents data on the direct foreign investment from many European countries. The first part of the table contains data on the inward investment from other EU countries as a percentage of GDP. There is an increase in investment from the rest of the EU for every country from 1991-1995 over 1986-1990 except Germany. This shows that even beyond 1992, European firms were increasing their involvement in other European countries. There were large increases in investment from the rest of Europe in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Table 5 also presents evidence on the changes in outward investment to other EU countries.
Here, there were increases in every country except Finland and Ireland from 1986 -1990 to 1991 -1995 . The largest changes were in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Portugal.
European foreign direct investment to other European societies was increasing during the first half of the 1990s. Firms were spreading their activities to other European societies and they were doing so at an ever higher rate.
( Table 6 about here) Table 6 explores the direction of the overall rate of European foreign direct investment between 1985-1997. One can see that total Europe foreign direct investment was on the increase from [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , it decreased slightly, and then increased dramatically from 1994-1997. The intra-European share of this investment followed a similar pattern. It increased between 1985-1990, decreased from 1990-2, and then increased from 1993-1997 . The share of total European direct foreign investment was relatively low from 1985-87 (between 27 and 45%). But it began to increase dramatically from 1988-1991. This reflects the merger movement of the late 1980s and the predominance in that merger movement of cross European border mergers. Since 1991, the share of total foreign direct investment that has remained in Europe has bounced around from a low of 52.5% in 1995 to a high of 65.8% in 1993. In 1997, it stood at 60.6%. This is more evidence that European foreign direct investment was increasing over this period and that it was focused during the 1990s predominantly in Europe.
( Table 7 about here)
During the late 1990s, there was a huge increase in corporate mergers around the world.
Between 1995-1999, cross border mergers rose from 186.6 billion dollars to 720.1 billion dollars (386% increase). version of globalization concerns the identities of buyers of firms. Here, European corporations were the largest purchasers of firms and much of this purchasing had to be going on outside of Europe (because the buying was so much higher than the selling). We know that most of the action was in American markets where many European firms bought themselves an immediate American presence through use of the market for corporate control. Table 7 suggests that while European firms were still busy expanding their European activities in the late 1990s, they were also busy buying assets in America.
Conclusion
The European Union is the largest trading zone in the world. It accounts for nearly half of world trade.
Astoundingly, almost 70% of that total originates and ends up in the EU. As of 1992, Eurostat, the agency in charge of collating statistics for the European Union started to describe this trade as the "internal market." They began to consider only trade outside of the EU as foreign trade. This clearly is a somewhat symbolic gesture, but it captures a real truth. The single market and the increases in trade in
Europe have changed the way that the largest European corporations operate.
It is clear that large European firms, in the run up to the single market, engaged in more mergers within their country and across national borders than they had previously done. After 1992, the tendency of the largest European firms to become more Europeanized continued. European firms increased their direct foreign investment in their neighbors across much of Europe from 1985-1990 to 1991-1995 . The share of all European foreign direct investment that stayed in Europe increased after 1987 and during most of the decade of the 1990s hovered around 60%. During the late 1990s cross border mergers in the world picked up. Europeans were the largest buyers and sellers in these markets.
This also increased the Europeanization of European firms. The main evidence that European firms were investing elsewhere (particularly the U.S.) came in 1999 when they purchased $152.8 billion dollars more firms than they sold. So, the Single Market and the euro are now economic facts that push forward Europeanization. The productive activities of the largest European firms have spread around
Europe.
There are several lessons to be drawn from our analysis. First, globalization is not a single process, but a set of processes whereby firms and nations around the world are interacting under different d ynamics. Second, one of the most important of these dynamics is European market integration. The political-legal-monetary project of the EU is now near completion. It has clearly affected the organization of the European economy and European firms in a dramatic way. The rapid increase in world trade in the 1990s was to a large degree driven by European economic integration.
The largest European corporations responded to these opportunities by expanding their production across Europe. They made investments in other societies and merged with other national and European firms.
Third, and perhaps most interesting, is the link between politics and markets. If we are right and the market building project of the EU does account for a large amount of change in the world economy, then this suggests an intimate link between politics and markets. Modern production markets require extensive rules to work. They require rules of exchange, competition policy, and a framework for property rights claims. They need some way to adjudicate legal differences. In sum, they need states.
Similarly, there is a certain cultural component that cannot be neglected. Convergence in business practices and conceptions of control seems to work better when cultural affinities are present. Hence, with the notable exception of Renault-Nissan and Daimler-Chrysler, we witness relatively more mergers between American and British firms and between French and Belgian firms than between culturally dissimilar or geographically remote firms.
There are several lessons for advocates of free trade and globalization from the European project. Most neoliberals favor a mainly negative integration project, i.e. the removal of trade barriers and environmental and labor standards as a prerequisite to free trade. But without collective governance, i.e. positive integration, there are limits on the degree to which firms will make investments in markets outside of their own (Scharpf, 1996) . The two most successful "single market" projects are the U.S. and the EU. It is not surprising that both occurred, not merely because of opportunities for entrepreneurs, but equally because governments produced rules that provided for positive integration.
Second, the Europeans have managed to create their single market without l essening labor or environmental standards or weakening significantly the social safety net. This proves that governments that provide social protection for their citizens do not undermine the possible gains to be made from free trade. There is little evidence that European firms are less competitive in the main markets in which they produce goods and services. Collective governance has not come at the cost of social protection. with firms from other countries, they have maintained their national identity. This can be explained by the fact that they continue to be incorporated in a particular society and dependent on the institutions of that society. In sum, firms are competing more across markets, but they are also maintaining their national character. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Year Number Mergers Joint Ventures 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Year Percentage National EU Non EU Other EU Countries (as % of GDP, yearly averages) (as % of GDP, yearly averages) 1986-1990 1991-1995 1986-1990 1991-1995 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 
